Security of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution by Moroder, Tobias et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
7.
55
44
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
3 J
ul 
20
12
Security of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution
Tobias Moroder,1 Marcos Curty,2 Charles Ci Wen Lim,3 Le Phuc Thinh,4 Hugo Zbinden,3 and Nicolas Gisin3
1Naturwissenschaftlich-Technische Fakulta¨t, Universita¨t Siegen, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, D-57068 Siegen, Germany
2EI Telecomunicacio´n, Dept. of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo, E-36310 Vigo, Spain
3Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland
4Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore
(Dated: January 23, 2018)
Distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution stands out for its easy implementation with
present day technology. Since many years, a full security proof of these schemes in a realistic setting
has been elusive. For the first time, we solve this long standing problem and present a generic
method to prove the security of such protocols against general attacks. To illustrate our result we
provide lower bounds on the key generation rate of a variant of the coherent-one-way quantum key
distribution protocol. In contrast to standard predictions, it appears to scale quadratically with the
system transmittance.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
Introduction.—Quantum key distribution (QKD) is on
the verge to become a standard tool for secure communi-
cations [1]. In its original proposal QKD is based on the
transmission of single photons. However, since true single
photon sources are not available yet most experimental
prototypes and all current commercial products of QKD
use weak laser pulses. A main drawback of these sys-
tems is that some signals contain more than one photon
prepared in the same quantum state. This fact severely
limits the distances that can be achieved by these tech-
niques due to the photon number splitting attack [2].
To enhance the performance of practical QKD sys-
tems, several approaches have been proposed. One so-
lution is to send a strong reference pulse together with
the quantum signals [3]. A second approach is based
on the decoy state method, where the transmitter sends
states with different intensities [4]. Both schemes pro-
vide a secret key generation rate that scales linearly with
the system transmittance [3, 4]. A third alternative is
to use distributed-phase-reference (DPR) QKD proto-
cols. They differ from standard QKD schemes in that
the receiver now performs joint measurements onto sub-
sequent signals, often given in the form of coherence mea-
surements [5, 6]. This approach includes the differential-
phase-shift [5] and the coherent-one-way (COW) [6] pro-
tocols. In the former, the sender prepares coherent states
of equal intensity but modulates their phases; in the
COW protocol all pulses share a common phase but their
intensities vary. A complete security proof of DPR-QKD
in a realistic setting has been missing since many years.
Security has only been proven so far against restricted
types of attacks [7–9], or assuming the use of ideal single
photon sources [10].
In this Letter we present a generic method to prove
security of practical DPR-QKD against general attacks.
This solves a long standing open question in the field of
quantum communications [1]. We illustrate our result
by providing non-trivial lower bounds for a variant of
the original COW protocol [11], which maintains all the
practical advantages. Our analysis suggests that prac-
tical DPR-QKD might not be as robust against imper-
fections as initially foreseen, i.e., its key rate appears to
scale quadratically with the system transmittance.
Security discussion.— The challenge in DPR-QKD is
to prove security against general, also termed coherent
attacks. Usually such attacks are known to be of no ad-
vantage to the eavesdropper (Eve) in comparison to col-
lective attacks by virtue of the de Finetti theorem [12].
This theorem applies, for instance, when the underly-
ing quantum state shared by the legitimate users (Al-
ice and Bob) is permutationally invariant. In standard
QKD this is typically ensured by performing simultane-
ous random permutations on the classical measurement
results. DPR-QKD defines however a fixed ordering of
the signals by its coherence measurement and, therefore,
it is not possible to permute the classical outcomes with-
out destroying vital information [13]. However, such a
predicament can be circumvented by grouping the en-
tire signal stream into blocks. More specifically, consider
that Alice and Bob group their signals into subsequent
blocks of size m, where the length m is optimized for the
expected behaviour. When permuting these blocks one
preserves the coherence information within them while
the information between the blocks is destroyed. Still
this is enough to apply the de Finetti argument on the
level of blocks. As a result, the state shared by Alice
and Bob after distributing a large number mN of signals
satisfies ρmNAB ≈ ρm ⊗NAB and security against collective
attacks on these signal blocks implies security against
coherent attacks in the original setting.
Suppose that the state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve
after transmitting an m block signal is ρmABE. Let us first
consider the effect of public announcements by Alice and
Bob based on their classical measurement results. This
announcement, labelled as v, allows both parties to dis-
tinguish between conclusive events that contribute to the
2sifted key and inconclusive ones that are discarded. On
the level of quantum states this is described by suitable
maps ΛAv ⊗ΛBv . Given an announcement v, that happens
with probability p(v), the three parties share the state
σm
A¯B¯E,v
determined by ΛAv ⊗ ΛBv (ρmABE) = p(v)σmA¯B¯E,v.
For each announcement v one can use a one-way clas-
sical post-processing key rate formula [14]. If system A¯
denotes a qubit and Alice’s raw key is obtained by pro-
jecting this system onto the orthogonal states |0〉A¯, |1〉A¯,
then a lower bound on the secret key rate is given by
1 − h2(ev) − h2(δv). Here h2 represents the binary en-
tropy, ev is the symmetrized bit error between the key
measurements of Alice and Bob, and δv denotes the cor-
responding error, typically called phase error, when Al-
ice performs a measurement in a mutually unbiased basis
and Bob in his other different setting. This last parame-
ter is used to upper bound Eve’s knowledge on the sifted
key generated by Alice. Note that δv does not need to be
measured directly, it only needs to be estimated. When
Bob’s measurements are similar qubit measurements like
the ones of Alice then the expression above represents
the Shor-Preskill key rate formula [15].
To consider that the output system A¯ is a qubit implies
that Alice can, at best, distill one secret bit per block.
Nevertheless this restriction should not have a significant
impact on the key rate in a long distance regime, since
Bob observes, if any, most often only one single conclusive
event per m arriving signals due to the high losses in the
channel (given that m is not too big).
Instead of estimating separate phase errors δv, it is
often easier to combine all conclusive announcements v ∈
Vc into an averaged version. Let G =
∑
v∈Vc
p(v) ≤ 1
denote the total sifted key gain. Then, we have that the
secret key rate per block can be bounded by
Rm ≥ inf
ρm
ABE
∑
v∈Vc
p(v) [1− h2(ev)− h2(δv)] (1)
≥ inf
ρmABE
G
[
1− h2(e¯c)− h2(δ¯/G)
]
≥ G [1− h2(e¯c)− h2(δ¯max/G)] . (2)
Here one uses concavity of h2 to lower bound Rm by the
averaged (conditional) error rates e¯c =
∑
v∈Vc
p(v)ev/G
and δ¯ =
∑
v∈Vc
p(v)δv. The last step takes into account
that e¯c and G are observed quantities and that the opti-
mization is attained at the largest phase error δ¯max com-
patible with the obtained data since h2 increases in [0,
1
2
].
Phase error estimation.— The main difficulty to com-
pute Eq. (2) is to upper bound the average phase error δ¯.
This parameter can be expressed as an expectation value
on the original bipartite state ρmAB = trE(ρ
m
ABE) using
adjoint maps
δ¯ =
∑
v∈Vc
p(v) tr(σm
A¯B¯,v
Fδv )=
∑
v∈Vc
tr[ΛAv ⊗ ΛBv (ρmAB)Fδv]
= tr[ρmAB
∑
v∈Vc
ΛA†v ⊗ ΛB†v (Fδv )] = tr(ρmABFδ¯). (3)
Here Fδv denote the corresponding phase error operators
on the state σm
A¯B¯,v
. Partial knowledge of Alice and Bob
about the state ρmAB can be parsed as known expectation
values ki = tr(ρ
m
ABKi) for certain operators Ki. This
means that the search for the maximum phase error δ¯max
can be cast into the form of a semidefinite program [16],
max tr(ρmABFδ¯) (4)
s.t. ρmAB  0, tr(ρmABKi) = ki ∀i.
Such special convex optimization problems can be solved
efficiently using standard tools to obtain the exact opti-
mum, even for large dimensions.
Available information and its description.— Let us
be more precise about which expectation values ki are
known in a prepare and measure scheme, where Alice
sends potentially mixed states ρmi with a priori probabil-
ity p(i). This state preparation can be formulated in an
entanglement based version as follows [17]: Alice first cre-
ates a source state |Ψm〉AbAsB =
∑
i
√
p(i)|i〉Ab |ρmi 〉AsB,
where |ρmi 〉AsB denote purifications of the signal states
ρmi to a shield system As [18]. Afterwards, she measures
her bit system Ab in the standard basis, thereby pro-
ducing the correct signal state at site B which is sent to
Bob. Eve transforms the overall source state to the final
tripartite state ρmABE with A = AbAs. On the receiving
side, Bob performs a measurement modelled by Bk. As a
result, both Alice and Bob observe the expectation values
of |i〉Ab〈i| ⊗ 1As ⊗ Bk. Moreover, since Eve is restricted
to interact only with Bob’s system, the reduced density
matrix ρmA = trBE(ρ
m
ABE) is fixed and directly given by
the source state. This information can be added by in-
cluding expectation values of Tk ⊗ 1B, where Tk denotes
a tomographic complete operator set on A. Both sets of
observables constitute the previously denoted set Ki.
The signal states and performed measurements in prac-
tical DPR-QKD are described by operators on an infinite
dimensional Fock space of several modes. In order to ap-
ply the de Finetti argument [12], and to numerically ob-
tain an upper bound on the phase error using Eq. (4), it
is necessary to formulate this problem in a manageable,
finite dimensional form. Clearly, system Ab is finite. For
Bob’s measurements one can employ the squash model
argument [19]. Here the real measurement is notionally
decomposed into a two step procedure by first applying
a map that transforms any incoming signal to a finite di-
mensional output state on which a specified target mea-
surement Bk is performed afterwards. Since this map
can be even given to Eve, its output state only lowers
the key generation capabilities of Alice and Bob, and one
readily works in finite dimensions. For our simulations
we assume that Bob has at his disposal inefficient photon
number resolving detectors with state independent dark
counts. Also, we consider that only the single photon
events within the whole block are finally considered as
conclusive. In this case the map outputs either a single
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FIG. 1. Schematic description of a COW protocol [11] with
an active measurement choice. Bob reads the raw key in de-
tector Dd. Moreover, he uses an optical switch to send some
pairs of consecutive pulses to a monitoring line that examines
the coherence between even and odd pulses sent by Alice.
photon, measured with the perfect detection scheme, or
an auxiliary state that triggers all inconclusive events.
For the shield system As one uses only partial informa-
tion of the reduced state. In the case of phase randomized
signal blocks, an example that we consider later, a purifi-
cation is given by storing the total photon number of the
block in the shield system |n〉As . Using only tomography
on the subspace spanned by all n = 1, . . . , ncut, together
with an ancilla state |N〉As for all other cases, the shield
system can effectively be described in finite dimensions.
Description of the protocol.— To illustrate our results
we analyze the security of a variant of the COW proto-
col [11]. The basic setup is shown in Fig. 1. Alice uses
a laser, followed by an intensity modulator (IM), to pre-
pare a sequence of coherent states |0〉|α〉 and |α〉|0〉. On
the receiving side, Bob employs an optical switch to dis-
tribute each pair of incoming pulses into the data or the
monitoring line [20]. The data line measures the arrival
time of the pulses in detector Dd and creates the raw key.
Whenever Bob sees a “click” in this detector in say time
instance i, he decides at random whether to publicly an-
nounce a detection event in time instances i and i+ 2 or
i and i − 2. The first case is associated with a bit value
“0”, while the second one corresponds to a bit value “1”.
If the state sent by Alice in these time instances is |0〉|α〉
(|α〉|0〉) then she assigns to it a bit value “0” (“1”) and
tells Bob to keep his result. Otherwise, the result is dis-
carded and does not contribute to the sifted key. Let us
illustrate this procedure with a simple example drawn in
Fig. 1, and assume that Bob observes a click in Dd in
time i. If he announces the pair i and i+2, then this re-
sult is discarded. Note that in this case Alice sent |α〉|α〉
and hence she cannot infer in which time slot Bob saw a
“click”. On the contrary, if Bob reports i and i− 2, then
both parties assign to it a bit value “1”. The monitoring
line checks for eavesdropping by measuring the coherence
between subsequent even and odd pulses sent by Alice.
This is done by interfering adjacent pairs of pulses in a
50 : 50 beamsplitter and measuring the output states in
detectors D+ and D−.
In the security analysis we assume that Alice and Bob
discard coherence information between consecutive sig-
nal blocks. Moreover we consider that the sifted key
is created only from signals within the same block. To
guarantee this, one could discard those detection events
where Bob declares time instances that belong to differ-
ent blocks. Alternatively, one could change Bob’s public
announcement slightly. For example, one can reorder the
2m possible detection time slots of a given block to form
a closed chain with the first and last time instances con-
nected. Now, if Bob observes a “click” in the data line in
say the first time slot he announces a detection event in
time instances one and three or one and 2m−1 with equal
probability, and similar for the other cases. This strategy
preserves the original symmetry in Bob’s announcement
and we use it in our simulations.
Simulation.— For simulation purposes, we consider
that Bob’s detectors are identical and have a dark count
rate of 10−7. The channel model includes an intrinsic
error rate of 1% in the data line together with an addi-
tional misalignment in the monitoring line that reduces
the interferometric visibility to 99%. More details on
this channel model and on the adapted security discus-
sion to the COW protocol are given in the appendix. We
study two different scenarios: (a) the case where all dif-
ferent m-signals blocks share the same phase, and (b)
the scenario where each block is phase randomized. The
resulting lower bounds on the secret key rate per pulse,
i.e., Rm/(2m), are illustrated in Fig. 2. For compari-
son, this figure includes as well a lower bound on the se-
cret key rate for a coherent-state version of the standard
BB84 protocol [21] with and without phase randomiza-
tion [22, 23]. For a given total system loss, i.e., including
the losses in the channel and in Bob’s detection appa-
ratus, we optimize the lower bound over the respective
signal strength α of Alice’s source which is of order 0.1.
As expected, we find that case (b) performs better than
that where all blocks share a common phase, since the
signal states are less distinguishable for an eavesdropper
without a global phase. We obtain that the tolerable
system loss for the COW protocol is, respectively, ≈ 19.5
dB (a), and ≈ 22.6 dB (b). The bit error and visibility
at these cutoff points are, respectively, ≈ 3% and ≈ 96%
(a), and ≈ 5.3% and ≈ 93.3% (b). Let us remark that
the lower bound with m = 2 even holds for threshold
detectors [24].
Our simulations reveal that a main limiting factor in
DPR-QKD seems to be the dark count rate of Bob’s de-
tectors. For given experimental parameters, there is an
optimal finite block size that allows a maximum tolerable
total system loss. If one increases the block size further
this does not translate into an improved lower bound
or distance. This is due to the fact that, in the high
loss regime, large sized blocks suffer from a higher dark
count probability per block than smaller sized blocks, and
this reduces the achievable secret key rate. A similar ef-
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FIG. 2. Lower bound on the secret key rate given by Eq. (2)
per pulse on a logarithmic scale (base 10) vs. the total sys-
tem loss in dB for the COW protocol illustrated in Fig. 1
using signal blocks carrying m bits of information (i.e., 2m
optical pulses) in the security proof. The upper figure corre-
sponds to the case where all blocks of signals share a common
phase, while the lower figure represents the situation where
each block is phase randomized. For comparison, we include a
lower bound on the secret key rate for a coherent-state version
of the standard BB84 protocol [21] with and without phase
randomization [22, 23]. We consider three main error con-
tributions: an intrinsic error rate of 1% in the data line, an
additional misalignment in the monitoring line reducing the
visibility to 99%, and a dark count rate in the detectors of
10−7. Moreover, in the lower figure we assume ncut = 2.
fect was already observed in the security analysis for the
differential-phase-shift protocol with true single photon
sources [10]. For a dark count rate per pulse of 10−7 the
optimal block size in the COW scheme turns out to be
m = 3, i.e., 6 optical pulses. Also, this figure shows that
a coherent-state version of the BB84 protocol without
decoy states can deliver notably higher key rates per sig-
nal than the analyzed COW protocol assuming the same
channel model. The reason for this might be threefold:
(1) the small optimal block size in the COW scheme; (2)
considering blocks, it can be shown that certain multi-
photon pulses are completely insecure; (3) most impor-
tantly, while in the BB84 the phase error is measured
directly, in the COW protocol it has to be estimated.
Possible improvements.—To further improve the lower
bounds shown in Fig. 2 there are several alternatives.
Since a main limitation seems to come from dark counts,
one may consider security in the fully calibrated device
scenario where these errors are not attributed to Eve.
As a quantitative bound on the performance of this sce-
nario we investigated the case of a zero dark count rate,
in which all key rate bounds shown in Fig. 2 shift by
about 3 dB, though the difference between the COW and
the BB84 protocol remains. Additionally, one can evalu-
ate different public announcements in a similar spirit like
the SARG protocol [25]. We considered different decla-
rations, but unfortunately none of them enhanced the re-
sulting key rate [26]. Another possibility is to include, for
instance, an extra monitoring line on Bob’s side to addi-
tionally check the coherence between subsequent pulses.
The state distribution part of this protocol is then very
similar to the one of the original COW scheme [6] with an
additional decoy signal composed by two vacuum pulses
as proposed in Ref. [9]. This hardware change improves
the maximum tolerable system loss by about 1 dB.
Another hardware change might be to include addi-
tional phase differences in the signal stream, such that
the signals states get closer to the one used in a BB84
protocol. Finally, one may ask whether different secu-
rity techniques might provide better lower bounds. For
instance, one could consider more valid detection events
per block. This needs however much larger block sizes
such that one obtains at all a reasonable fraction of two
or more click events in the long distance limit. Another
alternative would be to bound the rate by the individual
phase errors, i.e., directly using Eq. (1). This could give
a benefit if, for example, bits at the boundary are much
easier to infer by Eve than bit values originating from
events well inside the block. Moreover, it might be of ad-
vantage if Eve’s information is estimated by using differ-
ent, possibly not mutually unbiased basis measurements.
Here the more general key rate formula of Ref. [14] could
be used. Clearly another option would be to abandon
the block idea. However even in this case Eve could al-
ways attack the signals block-wise. Though a coherence
measurement across blocks would then reveal the eaves-
dropper, any coherence measurement within them would
be still fine. Hence when considering only an average
visibility this effect will become less and less important.
All these alternatives definitely deserve further investiga-
tions, but we do not expect a dramatic improvement.
Conclusion.— We have presented a generic method to
prove security of practical DPR-QKD against general at-
tacks. With the explicit example of a variant of the COW
protocol, we have shown that these schemes are indeed
secure for certain distances at given rates. Its perfor-
mance, however, seems to be less robust against practical
imperfections than originally expected.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we apply the described security
method to the explained version of the COW proto-
col [11]. In particular, we consider signal blocks carrying
m bits of information. Since a single bit comprises two
6modes, one has 2m different temporal modes described
by their creation and annihilation operators a†s and as,
respectively, with s = 1, . . . , 2m. We assume that the
l-th bit relates to the modes with s = 2l− 1, 2l.
Real and assumed measurement description.—At first
let us concentrate on the real measurement model M realk
and the way how we describe it in the security part, de-
noted as Bk in the main text. For the real measurement
setup we assume inefficient photon number resolving de-
tectors that suffer from state-independent dark counts.
The inefficiency of M realk is modelled by a global beam-
splitter (BS) of transmittance ηdet located in front of a
perfectly efficient scheme, labelled asMk, that still suffers
from dark counts. This is schematically drawn in the first
line of Fig. 3. In a second step, one models the efficient
scheme Mk as a map Λs, sometimes called squashing or
filter operation [19], in front of the assumed description
Bk. Let us emphasize that the security simulation is valid
for any true measurement scheme that can be modelled
as a physical map Λ followed by the measurement Bk as
shown in the third line of the figure.
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FIG. 3. Decomposition of Bob’s measuring device.
There are three different types of outcomes for the so
far abstract outcome label “k”. For a data line measure-
ment we use d, with d = 1, . . . , 2m, to denote a single
photon detection in temporal mode d only. The corre-
sponding measurement operator Md is given by
Md = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1|vac〉〈vac|+ (1− ǫ)2m|d〉〈d|, (5)
with ǫ representing the dark count probability of Bob’s
detectors and |d〉 = a†d|vac〉. In addition to a data line
measurement Bob can also perform coherence measure-
ments on subsequent bits employing the monitoring line.
For instance, whenever he tests the coherence between
bits l and l+1 he effectively mixes the modes 2l−1, 2l+1
and, at the same time, 2l, 2l+ 2. For each pair of modes
there are two single photon events, denoted as ±, that
can be distinguished, depending on whether the single
excitation is registered in the bright (D+) or in the dark
(D−) detector. As an outcome label for the coherence
measurements we use k = (c,±), where c = 1, . . . , 2m−2
denotes the first of the two interfering modes. In this case
the measurement operators are given by
Mc,± = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1|vac〉〈vac|+(1− ǫ)2m|χ±c 〉〈χ±c |, (6)
with |χ±c 〉 = (|c〉 ± |c+ 2〉)/
√
2. Let us emphasize that
in these coherence measurements it is still necessary to
check that all other modes are empty. Finally, note that
each measurement setting has also other possible out-
comes, e.g., “no click” or more than a single photon de-
tection event. All these cases are grouped (via classical
post-processing) into a single inconclusive outcome de-
scribed by Minc.
As the modelled measurement operators Bk we use
Bd = |d〉〈d|,
Bc,± = |χ±c 〉〈χ±c |,
Binc = |a〉〈a|, (7)
where |a〉 is the auxiliary state that describes the incon-
clusive outcome. These measurement operators Bk act
on a 2m+ 1 dimensional Hilbert space.
Both measurement sets can be made equivalent by an
appropriate map Λs such that tr(ρMk) = tr[Λs(ρ)Bk]
holds for all possible states ρ and measurement outcomes
“k” as schematically shown in Fig. 3. This map Λs is
given as follows. First one measures the total number
of photons n within an arriving block. Whenever one
finds n ≥ 2 one outputs the auxiliary state |a〉. If n = 1
then with probability (1 − ǫ)2m the single photon state
stays untouched, otherwise the auxiliary state is thrown
again. Finally, for n = 0 the map creates the completely
mixed single photon state
∑
k |k〉〈k|/2m with probability
2mǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1 and |a〉 otherwise. This map is physical
because we explicitly describe it in terms of measure-
ments and conditional signal state preparations.
Source state and reduced density matrix.— The follow-
ing discussion provides the source states for both cases
of pure or phase randomized COW block signals. These
states determine the reduced density matrix ρmA which
belongs to the available information.
Let us consider first the case of pure signal states. In
the COW protocol analyzed Alice sends to Bob either
the sequence |α, 0〉 or |0, α〉, with α ∈ R, depending on
whether her raw key bit value is “0” or “1”. Let us start
with the scenario where Alice sends to Bob only one bit
value, occurring with equal a priori probability. This
corresponds to a block size m = 1. Then the source state
is given by
|Ψm=1〉AB =
1√
2
(|0〉A|α, 0〉B + |1〉A|0, α〉B), (8)
and its reduced density matrix becomes
ρm=1A =
1
2
[
1 e−α
2
e−α
2
1
]
. (9)
Suppose now that Alice sends to Bob m bits according
to this scheme. If i = (i1, i2, . . . , im) denotes the m-bit
string being sent and |φi〉B refers to the corresponding
7signal state, then one obtains
|Ψm〉AB = 2−
m
2
∑
i∈{0,1}m
|i〉A|φi〉B
= |Ψm〉A1...AmB = |Ψm=1〉
⊗m
AB . (10)
In particular, from the last expression one finds that the
reduced density matrix ρmA is given by
ρmA = (ρ
m=1
A )
⊗m. (11)
Next, let us turn to the case of phase randomized
blocks. Since randomizing the phase of a block is equiva-
lent to measuring the total number of photons contained
in it, the true signals states are of the form
ρmi =
∞∑
n=0
Πn|φi〉B〈φi|Πn =
∞∑
n=0
pλ(n)|ψin〉B〈ψin|. (12)
Here Πn stands for the projector onto the n-photon sub-
space of the 2m different modes. The outcome of such
a photon number measurement follows a Poisson distri-
bution pλ(n) = e
−λλn/n! with mean λ = mα2. The
projected n-photon signal states |ψin〉B can be expressed
as
|ψin〉B = m−
n
2
√
n!
∑
n1,...nm
m∏
l=1
(a†2l+il−1)
nl
nl!
|vac〉B, (13)
where the summation runs over all natural numbers
n1, . . . , nm that satisfy
∑m
l=1 nl = n. These states ful-
fill the relation
〈ψin|ψjn¯〉 = δnn¯
(
m−∆ij
m
)n
, (14)
with ∆ij being the Hamming distance between the bit
strings i and j, i.e., the number of places they differ.
Using the framework of mixed signal states as ex-
plained in the main text one must now choose an overall
purification of all signal states |ψin〉B. For our simulation
we select
|ρmi 〉AsB =
∞∑
n=0
√
pλ(n)|n〉As |ψin〉B, (15)
which can be seen as a coherent storage of the total pho-
ton number n in the shield system As. Let us remark
that this choice satisfies 〈ρmi |ρmj 〉 = F (ρmi , ρmj ), with F
being the fidelity of mixed states, which is also the max-
imal possible overlap between two signal states [27]. We
find, therefore, that the source state in this scenario is
given by
|Ψm〉AbAsB = 2−
m
2
∑
i∈{0,1}m
|i〉Ab |ρmi 〉AsB, (16)
with Ab = A1 . . .Am. This means that the reduced den-
sity matrix ρmA , with A = AbAs, can be expressed as
ρmA =
∞∑
n=0
pλ(n)ρ
n
Ab
⊗ |n〉As〈n|, (17)
with ρnAb given by
ρnAb = 2
−m
∑
i,j
(
m−∆ij
m
)n
|i〉Ab〈j|. (18)
In our simulation we only use partial information of the
reduced density matrix ρmA . In particular, we transform
As to A¯s by making a shield measurement that distin-
guishes the different photon number cases mentioned in
the main text such that one obtains
ρm
AbA¯s
=
ncut∑
n=1
pλ(n)ρ
n
Ab
⊗ |n〉A¯s〈n|
+
∑
n6∈{1,...,ncut}
pλ(n)ρ
n
Ab
⊗ |N〉A¯s〈N |, (19)
where |N〉A¯s denotes an auxiliary system for all higher
photon numbers. Let us point out that considering the
reduced state given by Eq. (19) can be understood as
“tagging” the n = 1, . . . , ncut signal states [22].
Announcement maps and phase operator.—The spe-
cific announcements v of the COW protocol can be
phrased in terms of appropriate maps Λv on the quantum
state. Together with a chosen “phase setting” measure-
ment this provides a concrete expression for the averaged
phase error operator Fδ¯ used in Eq. (3).
As explained in the protocol description, Bob an-
nounces two consecutive even or odd time slots where
he registered his single photon event. Suppose, for in-
stance, that he announces v = (2l− 1, 2l+ 1). These are
the first arrival times of the modes associated with bits
il and il+1 sent by Alice. In such cases, Alice and Bob
agree to call the outcome in the first time instance “0”
while the later event is “1”. This announcement can be
modelled as a filter operation ΛBv (ρ) = F
B
v ρF
B†
v given by
FBv =
1√
2
(|0〉B¯B〈2l − 1|+ |1〉B¯B〈2l+ 1|) . (20)
If Bob measures system B¯ in the standard basis |0〉B¯, |1〉B¯
he obtains the real outcome he has observed. The pre-
factor 1/
√
2 which appears in Eq. (20) takes into account
that whenever Bob sees a single photon click in either
2l − 1 or 2l + 1 he announces this particular v with just
50% probability, i.e., FB†v F
B
v = (B2l−1 +B2l+1)/2.
Suppose Bob has actually declared v = (2l− 1, 2l+1).
Then, Alice has to look on her bit string to determine
whether she can conclusively infer Bob’s bit value. For
that, only her bits il and il+1 matter. As shown in Fig. 4,
if these two bits are equal it means that she had sent to
Bob either two full or two empty pulses. In this scenario,
8she cannot infer Bob’s bit value and they discard this
result. However, if these bits differ then she knows Bob’s
sifted bit value precisely (in the error free case) and she
tells Bob to keep it. Such a conclusive announcement
2l+2 2l+1 2l 2l-1il+1
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
il
Discard
Discard
Alice's bits Bob's declaration Alice's declaration
=⇒
=⇒
=⇒
=⇒
Keep
Keep
FIG. 4. Announcement choices for Alice given that Bob has
declared a detection event in time slots 2l − 1 and 2l + 1.
by Alice can similarly be modelled as a filter operation
ΛAv acting on her qubits l and l+ 1, i.e., Λ
A
v (ρ
m
A1...Am
) =
FAv ρ
m
AlAl+1
FA†v with
FAv = |0〉A¯ AlAl+1〈01|+ |1〉A¯ AlAl+1〈10|. (21)
Again a measurement in the standard basis |0〉A¯, |1〉A¯
provides Alice with her real outcomes.
In order to determine the phase error δv we assume
that both parties perform measurements in the X-basis,
i.e., they project the output signals from their filter op-
erations onto the states |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. Then, the
symmetrized phase error δv = p(+,−) + p(−,+) can be
expressed as
p(v)δv = p(v) tr[
1
2
(1⊗ 1− σx ⊗ σx)σmA¯B¯,v]
=
1
2
p(v)− 1
2
tr(σx ⊗ σxp(v)σmA¯B¯,v)
=
1
2
p(v)− tr(X ′A ⊗X ′BρmAB), (22)
with σx denoting the Pauli matrix σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|.
In the last line of Eq. (22) we have defined the operators
X ′A = 1A1...Al−1 ⊗XA ⊗ 1Al+2...Am ,
X ′B =
1
2
FB†v σxF
B
v
=
1
4
(|2l − 1〉〈2l+ 1|+ |2l + 1〉〈2l− 1|) , (23)
with XA = F
A†
v σxF
A
v = |01〉〈10|+ |10〉〈01|.
Similar arguments apply to the cases where Bob an-
nounces subsequent even outcome pairs or the special
instances at the borders of the blocks. We find that the
averaged phase error δ¯ =
∑
v∈Vc
p(v)δv can be written as
δ¯ =
1
2
∑
v∈Vc
p(v)− tr(Xδ¯ρmAB), (24)
with an operator Xδ¯ =
∑m
l=1XA;l ⊗ XB;l. Here XA;l
denotes the operator composed by the previously defined
XA acting on qubits l and l+1 and the identity operator
acting on the remaining qubits (l = m means the first
and last qubit). On Bob’s side the operators XB;l are
given by
XB;l =
1
4
(|2l− 1〉〈2l + 1|+ |2l+ 1〉〈2l − 1|
+|2l〉〈2l+ 2|+ |2l + 2〉〈2l|), (25)
with addition being carried out modulo 2m.
Channel model.—In this section we present the em-
ployed channel model of the COW experiment used in
our numerical simulations. Note, however, that the re-
sults presented in this article can be applied as well to any
other quantum channel, as they only depend on the ob-
served detection probabilities in both the data and mon-
itoring lines.
In particular, we characterize the losses in the channel
with a BS of transmittance ηchannel. This parameter can
be related with a transmission distance d measured in
km for the given QKD scheme as
ηchannel = 10
−αd
10 , (26)
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel (e.g.,
an optical fiber) measured in dB/km. Together with the
efficiency of the detectors the overall system transmit-
tance is given by
ηsys = ηchannelηdet. (27)
The total system loss in dB is used as the x-axis in the
secret key rate figures, i.e., −10 log10 ηsys.
The channel misalignment is parametrized with an er-
ror probability ed that a signal hits Bob’s detectors in
the wrong time slot within the same bit. For simplic-
ity, we assume that ed is a constant independent of the
distance and we use ed = 1% for simulation purposes.
This effect is modelled by a completely positive trace-
preserving map Φ that incoherently flips the signal states
within the same bit slot as |0,√ηsysα〉 7→ |√ηsysα, 0〉 and
|√ηsysα, 0〉 7→ |0,√ηsysα〉 with probability ed. Here we
consider that the input signals have been already affected
by system losses. We have, therefore, that whenever Al-
ice sends to Bob a corresponding COW signal state with
coherent state |α〉 in temporal mode d, the probability
that Bob observes a single photon detection event in this
mode only (within the whole signal block) is given by
pcorrectd = tr{Λs[Φ⊗m(ρmloss)]Md} = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ
+(1− ǫ)2m(1− ed)ηsysµe−ηsysλ, (28)
where ρmloss represents the output signal of the BS char-
acterizing the total system loss, µ = α2, and λ = mµ.
Similarly, when Alice sends to Bob a vacuum state in
temporal mode d Bob can observe a single photon detec-
tion event in this mode only with probability
perrord = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ
+(1− ǫ)2medηsysµe−ηsysλ. (29)
9The total probability that Bob observes an inconclusive
detection event in the data line is then given by
pinc = 1−m
(
pcorrectd + p
error
d
)
. (30)
In the monitoring line we include an additional mis-
alignment effect that reduces further the interferometric
visibility. In particular, we assume that whenever two
equal coherent states interfere at a 50 : 50 BS then the
outcome signal can exit the BS through the wrong output
port with error probability em. In our simulations we use
em = 0.5%. Here we distinguish two possible scenarios,
depending on whether the signals which interfere at the
BS were prepared by Alice in the same quantum state or
not. Let us assume that the first signal corresponds to
bit il while the later to bit il+1. That is, Bob interferes
modes 2l − 1, 2l+ 1 and, at the same time, 2l, 2l+ 2.
Let us consider first the situation where both signals
were generated in the same state |0, α〉. In this scenario,
we find that Bob observes a single photon detection event
in temporal mode 2l−1 only (and no click in the remain-
ing modes of the block) with probability
p2l−1,+ = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1− ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
× [2(1− ed)2(1− em) + ed(1− ed)] ,
p2l−1,− = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1− ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
× [2(1− ed)2em + ed(1 − ed)] , (31)
where the superscript ± indicates whether the single ex-
citation is registered in the bright (D+) or in the dark
(D−) detector of the monitoring line. Similarly, we have
that the probability that Bob sees a single photon detec-
tion in temporal mode 2l only is given by
p2l,+ = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1− ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
× [2e2d(1− em) + ed(1− ed)] ,
p2l,− = ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1− ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
× [2e2dem + ed(1− ed)] . (32)
The case where both signals were generated in the same
state |α, 0〉 is completely analogous. One only needs to
interchange Eqs. (31) and (32).
Finally, let us consider the situation where both sig-
nals are prepared in a different quantum state. In this
scenario the probabilities are given by
p2l−1,+ = p2l,+
= ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1− ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
×
[
2ed(1− ed)(1 − em) + 1 + 2e
2
d − 2ed
2
]
,(33)
and
p2l−1,− = p2l,−
= ǫ(1− ǫ)2m−1e−ηsysλ + (1 − ǫ)2mηsysµe−ηsysλ
×
[
2ed(1− ed)em + 1+ 2e
2
d − 2ed
2
]
. (34)
